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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
OKLAHOMA'S NEW RULES ON LAWYER
ADVERTISING AND SOLICITATION
I. INTRODUCTION
In response to the Supreme Court's indication inIn re R.M.J I that
strict state regulation of lawyer advertising may be unconstitutional, 2
the Oklahoma Supreme Court has amended the Oklahoma Code of
Professional Responsibility to include new disciplinary rules concern-
ing lawyer advertising and solicitation.3 The new rules allow lawyers
much greater freedom in promoting their services than did the former
rules,4 and thus are likely to be viewed favorably by those lawyers who
desire to advertise. Further, better informed consumer decisions about
legal services should result from the increased flexibility of the new
rules.5 This Recent Development will compare the new rules to
Oklahoma's former rules and the provisions of the Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct concerning lawyer advertising,6 consider the consti-
1. 455 U.S. 191 (1982). R.MJ was judicially acknowledged in Oklahoma in State ex rel
Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Schaffer, 648 P.2d 355, 357 (Okla. 1982). For discussions of the impact of
R.MJ on the regulation of lawyer advertising, see Casenote, In re R.M.J.: Easing Restrictions on
Attorney Advertising, 23 S. TEx. L.J. 455 (1982); Recent Development, Lanyer Advertising in
Oklahoma after In re R.M.J., 18 TULSA L.J. 136 (1982); Note, Professional Responsibili y-Lawver
Advertising-Restrictions Must Be Narrowly Drawn To Serve Substantial State Interest, 5 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L.J. 457 (1982).
2. See infra notes 100-09 and accompanying text.
3. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3, DR 2-101 to -106 (West Supp. 1983).
4. See infra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 141-45 and accompanying text.
6. MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 7.1-.5 (1983), reprinted in 52 U.S.L.W.
1 (Aug. 16, 1983). The Model Rules were promulgated by the American Bar Association's Com-
mission on Evaluation of Professional Standards. The Commission (known as the Kutak Com-
mission after its chairman, Robert J. Kutak) was formed in 1977 to study the desirability of
amending the Model Code of Professional Responsibility. Kettlewell, Keep the Format of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, 67 A.B.A. J. 1628, 1628 (1981). Amendment was deemed
necessary because of, among other things, changes in state and federal law, inconsistencies within
the Code itself, and pressure from independent regulatory agencies stressing a lawyer's obligations
to the "public interest" over his duties to clients. Kutak, Model Rules of Professional Conduct-
Ethical Standards for the '80s and Beyond, 67 A.B.A. J. 1116, 1116 (1981). Instead of recom-
mending amendments, however, the Commission advocated abandonment of the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility in favor of the new Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which are
"intended to serve as a national model of the regulatory law-enforceable standards of conduct-
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tutionality of the new rules under the standards set forth in R.M.J, and
evaluate the effect of the changes on lawyers and consumers.
II. ANALYSIS OF THE NEW RULES
Under the "regulatory" approach to lawyer advertising, only spe-
cifically prescribed types of advertising are permitted.7 Oklahoma's for-
mer rules, which employed the regulatory approach, 8 greatly restricted
the information which could be included in a lawyer's public commu-
nications9 and professional materials,' ° and limited the types of media
available to an advertising lawyer."
The committee charged with the task of conforming Oklahoma's
advertising rules to constitutional requirements patterned its proposals
after the Final Draft of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 2 In
contrast to the regulatory approach, the Model Rules employ a "direc-
tive" approach which "do[es] not specify what a lawyer may advertise;
governing the practice of law." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT chairman's introduc-
tory note (Final Draft 1982), reprinted in 68 A.B.A. J. 3 (Pullout Supp. Nov. 1982). The Model
Rules of Professional Conduct were adopted by the ABA on August 2, 1983. Bar Association
Approves Code of Ethics with Controversial Confidentiality Rule, Wall St. J., Aug. 3, 1983, at 4, col.
2.
7. ABA Task Force on Lawyer Advertising, Report to the Board of Governors, reprinted in L.
ANDREWS, BIRTH OF A SALESMAN: LAWYER ADVERTISING AND SOLICITATION 91, 92 (1980).
8. Many of Oklahoma's former rules apparently were based on a preliminary draft of
amendments to the Model Code of Professional Responsibility proposed by the ABA's Task Force
on Lawyer Advertising in August 1977. Hellman, The Oklahoma Supreme Court's New Rules on
Lawyer Advertising: Some Practical, Legal, and Policy Questions, 31 OKLA. L. REv. 509, 521 n.80
(1978).
9. Under the former rules, only the following information could be advertised: (1) name;
(2) addresses; (3) telephone numbers; (4) foreign language ability; (5) credit arrangements;
(6) hours of availability; (7) certain types of fee information; and (8) a limited indication of the
lawyer's field of practice. OKLA. STAT. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3, DR 2-101(B)(l)-(8) (1981) (amended
1983). These restrictions and others also applied to listings in the classified sections of telephone
directories. Id DR 2-101(D). More extensive information could be included in a "reputable"
legal directory, including organization memberships, references, names of clients regularly repre-
sented (but only if they consented in writing), and fields of practice. Id DR 2-102(A)(5)(a)-(q).
10. Information which attorneys could convey on professional cards was limited to name,
addresses, telephone numbers, firm name, and a limited indication of fields of practice. Id DR 2-
102(A)(1). Professional announcements were not to state "biographical data except to the extent
reasonably necessary to identify the lawyer or to explain the change in his association." Id DR 2-
102(A)(2). Office signs were limited to "identifying the law office," id DR 2-102(A)(3), and letter-
heads could include only names, addresses, telephone numbers, predecessor firms, and certain
information concerning fields of practice, id DR 2-102(A)(4).
11. Lawyers were permitted to advertise only in print media by the former rules. Id DR 2-
101(B).
12. Interview with Frederick K. Slicker, Member, Oklahoma Special Committee on Legal
Advertising Rules, in Tulsa, Oklahoma (Sept. 12, 1983). Major changes were made to the Final
Draft prior to its adoption. As a result, there are significant differences between some of the
provisions of the Model Rules and the new Oklahoma rules, but the basic approach of the Model
Rules remains consistent with the Oklahoma rules.
1983]
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[it] only provide[s] the general guidelines for what a lawyer may not
advertise."' 3 As a result, Oklahoma's new rules eliminate most of the
specific restrictions of the old rules. Instead, they prohibit, in general
terms, the publication of "false or misleading communication[s] about
the lawyer or the lawyer's services."' 4 The new rules allow a lawyer to
advertise in virtually any medium and to include any information he
chooses, as long as the advertisement meets this standard.'
A. DR 2-101: Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services
The former rules prohibited any advertising containing a "false,
fraudulent, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim"' 6 and required
that all information advertised be "accurate, reliable, truthful, and dis-
played in a professional and dignified manner." 17 The size of adver-
tisements was limited,'8 and signs, symbols, and pictures could not be
used in advertisements.19 The new rules eliminate all these restrictions,
and instead simply prohibit a lawyer from making any "false or mis-
leading communication" about himself or his services.20 In making
this change the Oklahoma Supreme Court appears to have placed more
emphasis on the communication's misleading effect on the client or po-
tential client, rather than the content of the advertisement, as the basis
for disciplinary action.2 '
The new rules specify four types of communications which will be
considered false or misleading.22 First, communications which contain
a "material misrepresentation of fact or law" or which omit data neces-
sary to make the communication nonmisleading are prohibited.23 Sec-
ond, communications "likely to create an unjustified expectation about
the results the lawyer can achieve"'24 are also forbidden. The latter pro-
vision may prove more difficult to interpret than the former because its
13. Andrews, Lawyer Advertising and the First Amendment, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH
J. 967, 988 (1981).
14. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3, DR 2-101(A) (West Supp. 1983).
15. See infra notes 16-44 and accompanying text.
16. OKLA. STAT. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3, DR 2-101(A) (1981) (amended 1983).
17. Id DR 2-101(B).
18. Id DR 2-101(G) (maximum size often square inches).
19. Id DR 2-101(I).
20. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3, DR 2-101(A) (West Supp. 1983).
21. Robert J. Kutak noted that the Model Rules of Professional Conduct constitute "a more
client-centered code." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT chairman's introductory note
(Final Draft 1982).
22. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3, DR 2-101(A)(l)-(4) (West Supp. 1983).
23. Id DR 2-101(A)(1).
24. Id DR 2-101(A)(2).
[Vol. 19:292
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subjective language does not indicate the types of advertising which
will be considered likely to create unjustified expectations. The com-
ment to the Model Rule upon which this provision was based states
that the rule is intended to preclude "advertisements about results ob-
tained on behalf of a client, such as the amount of a damage award or
the lawyer's record in obtaining favorable verdicts, and advertisements
containing client endorsements."2S This comment should provide gui-
dance to Oklahoma authorities interpreting the rule.
A third type of prohibited communication is a statement or impli-
cation that the lawyer can achieve a result by violating the law.26 Fi-
nally, a lawyer is not permitted to compare his services with those of
another lawyer unless he can factually substantiate the comparison.27
Other types of communications may also be found "false or mislead-
ing" as Oklahoma authorities apply the new rule.28
Although many restrictions on lawyer communications have been
removed, the language of the new rules may be interpreted to encom-
pass more types of communications than the former rules. Advertise-
ments which are not inaccurate, unfair, or self-laudatory may still be
considered "misleading." Also, while the former rule regulated all
"public communications" made by lawyers,29 the adjective "public"
has been omitted from the new rule.3" As the phrase "public communi-
cation" suggests an advertisement,31 this change may indicate that any
public or private lawyer communication, whether or not made to ob-
tain professional employment, must now be made in compliance with
the Code.
The former rules stated that a lawyer's communications on behalf
of a partner, associate, or other lawyer affiliated with him were subject
to the same restrictions applicable to communications by a lawyer con-
cerning himself.32 The new rules appear to apply only to a lawyer's
25. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.1 comment (1983).
26. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3, DR 2-101(A)(3) (West Supp. 1983).
27. Id DR 2-10l(A)(4).
28. The language of the new rules does not indicate that the four specifically prohibited types
of communications comprise an exclusive list of "false or misleading" communications. See id
DR 2-101(A).
29. OKLA. STAr. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3, DR 2-101(A) (1981) (amended 1983).
30. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3, DR 2-101(A) (West Supp. 1983).
31. Webster defines "advertise" as "to make publicly and generally known." WEBSTER'S
NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 17 (1981) (emphasis added).
32. "A lawyer shall not, on behalf of himself, his partner, associate or any other lawyer affili-
ated with him or hisfirm, use, or participate in the use of any form of public communication
containing a false, fraudulent, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim." OKLA. STAr. tit. 5, ch.
1, app. 3, DR 2-101(A) (1981) (amended 1983) (emphasis added).
1983]
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communications about himself, and not to his communications regard-
ing other lawyers.33 The new rules, however, may be interpreted to
encompass communications about any lawyer despite the lack of lan-
guage to that effect. Further, false or misleading statements made on
behalf of other lawyers may still be prohibited by the Code provision
forbidding "conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation.
'34
B. DR 2-102: Advertising
Under the old rules, a lawyer could advertise only in certain print
media, including newspapers of general circulation,35 telephone and
city directories, 36 and "other print media . . . published on a regular
basis, the primary purpose of which is other than the publication of
information about a lawyer or small group of lawyers."37 The new
rules remove almost all major restrictions on lawyers' choice of media.
Radio and television advertisements are now permissible, as is any
form of "written communication not involving personal contact. ' 38
The former rules allowed a lawyer to advertise only in media "dis-
tributed in the geographic area or areas in which the lawyer resides or
maintains offices or in which a significant part of the lawyer's clientele
resides."39 This limitation has been termed a "blatant restraint on
competition" between "big city" and "small town" attorneys.4" The
new rules impose no such geographic restrictions on lawyer
advertising.4'
Under the new rules, advertisements mailed to specific individuals,
as well as general mailings, are permissible.42 The front of the envel-
33. "A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the
lawyer's services." OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3, DR 2-101(A) (West Supp. 1983) (em-
phasis added).
34. OKA. STAT. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3, DR 1-102(A)(4) (1981) (amended 1983).
35. Id DR 2-101(C)(1).
36. Id DR 2-101(C)(2).
37. Id DR 2-101(C)(3).
38. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3, DR 2-102(A) (West Supp. 1983). Any such com-
munication must include "the name of at least one lawyer responsible for its content." Id DR 2-
102(D); see also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.2(d) (1983) (same). This
provision is worded broadly enough to permit even outdoor advertising. Cf MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.2(a) (1983) (expressly sanctions outdoor advertising). But see In
re Utah State Bar, 647 P.2d 991, 995 (Utah 1982) (upholding state "time, place, and manner"
restriction on use of billboards).
39. OKLA. STAT. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3, DR 2-101(B) (1981) (amended 1983).
40. Hellman, supra note 8, at 560.
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ope or postcard of all mailed advertisements must conspicuously state
"This is an advertisement" in type that is at least the same size as the
address.4 3 Personal delivery of written material, however, is prohib-
ited.' The Model Rules as adopted permit general mailings, but for-
bid lawyers from sending advertisements to specific individuals.45
Though the new rules do not require official approval of an adver-
tisement prior to placement,46 a lawyer is required to maintain a writ-
ten or recorded copy of the advertisement as well as records of where
and when the advertisement was used.47 If the advertisement is mailed,
a record of each recipient's identity must also be maintained.48 While
the comparable Model Rule requires that such records be retained for
only two years,49 Oklahoma's new rule mandates a three-year retention
period°---a result of the Oklahoma Bar Association's concern that po-
tential violations of the advertising rules may not be brought to its at-
tention within a shorter time frame.51
As with the old rules, a lawyer is bound by the fees he advertises. 2
Fee representations in printed advertisements are binding for a period
ranging from 30 days to one year or more after the date of publication,
depending on the frequency of publication of the print medium. 3 A
43. Id DR 2-102(E).
44. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.2 comment (Final Draft 1982)
(noting that advertisements can be mailed by the postal service or a similar delivery service).
45. Mailings under the Model Rules are now limited to "letters addressed or advertising
circulars distributed generally to persons not known to need legal services of the kind provided by
the lawyer in a particular matter, but who are so situated that they might in general find such
services useful." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3 (1983). The Model Rules
thus distinguish between mailed advertisements which are made to a "specific recipient," labeling
these "direct mail" advertisements, and mailings to recipients not known to need legal services,
naming these "general mailings." Id Rule 7.3 comment. Direct mailings are prohibited under
the Model Rules because they more closely approximate solicitation, id, which the Model Rules
prohibits in most instances. See infra note 63.
46. A requirement of official approval of lawyer advertisements was rejected by the drafters
of the Model Rules on the basis that "[s]uch a requirement would be burdensome and expensive
relative to its possible benefits, and may be of doubtful constitutionality." MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.2 comment (Final Draft 1982) (Record of Advertising).
47. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3, DR 2-102(B) (West Supp. 1983).
48. Id DR 2-102(C).
49. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.2(b) (1983).
50. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, ch. I, app. 3, DR 2-102(B), (C) (West Supp. 1983).
51. Interview with Frederick K. Slicker, Member, Oklahoma Special Committee on Legal
Advertising, in Tulsa, Oklahoma (June 29, 1983).
52. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3, DR 2-102(F) (West Supp. 1983) (lawyers are
bound by advertised fees plus expenses incurred).
53. Id DR 2-102(H) (lawyers are bound for 30 days after publication of advertisement in
media published more frequently than once a month, bound until the next publication date after
advertising in media published once a month or less frequently, and bound for a reasonable time
of not less than one year after advertising in a medium with no fixed date for publication of the
6
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lawyer advertising on radio, television, or other electronic media must
abide by fee representations from the date of the first broadcast of the
advertisement until 30 days after its last broadcast. 4 In contrast to the
old rules,5" there are now no restrictions on the types of fee information
a lawyer may advertise.
Under both the new and old Oklahoma rules lawyers are generally
precluded from paying others to recommend their services.5 6 They
may, however, pay the reasonable costs of advertising and the reason-
able fees of a nonprofit lawyer referral service or other legal service
organization.57 As under the old rules, 8 lawyers are prohibited from
rendering payment of any type for professional publicity in a news
item.5 9
C. DR 2-103. Personal Contact with Prospective Clients
The former rules concerning recommendation of a lawyer's serv-
ices6° and solicitation of employment6' have been combined and clari-
fied in one rule in the amended Code. 2 Client solicitation, either in
person or by telephone, is permissible in a limited number of situations.
For instance, a lawyer may solicit employment from a close friend or
relative, or from a former client or a person he reasonably believes to
be a former client, if that contact pertains to former employment. 3 A
next issue). This provision is essentially identical to that contained in the former rule. See OKLA.
STAT. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3, DR 2-101(F) (1981) (amended 1983).
54. OKLA. STAT ANN. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3, DR 2-102(G) (West Supp. 1983).
55. In the former rule, fee information which could be advertised was limited to:
(a) fees charged for an initial consultation;
(b) the availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee
to be charged for the specific service;
(c) hourly rate, provided that the statement discloses that the total fee charged will
depend on the number of hours which must be devoted to the particular matter
(d) fixed fees for specific legal services, the description of which service is not subject to
misunderstanding or is not deceptive, provided that the statement discloses that the
quoted fee will be available only to clients whose matters fall into the services de-
scribed. ...
OKLA. STAT. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3, DR 2-101(B)(7)(a)-(d) (1981) (amended 1983).
56. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, ch. I, app. 3, DR 2-102(l) (West Supp. 1983); OKLA. STAT. tit. 5,
ch. 1, app. 3, DR 2-103(B) (1981) (amended 1983).
57. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3, DR 2-102(1) (West Supp. 1983). The comparable
Model Rule is substantially similar, but does not include Oklahoma's express prohibition on both
direct and indirect payments. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.2(c) (1983).
58. OKLA. STAT. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3, DR 2-101(K) (1981) (amended 1983).
59. OKLA STAT. ANN. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3, DR 2-102(J) (West Supp. 1983).
60. OKLA. STAT. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3, DR 2-103 (1981) (amended 1983).
61. Id DR 2-104.
62. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3, DR 2-103 (West Supp. 1983).
63. Id DR 2-103(A)(1). Such contact was also allowed under the former Oklahoma rule.
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lawyer operating under the "auspices of a public or charitable legal
services organization"'  or a "bona fide political, social, civil, fraternal,
employee or trade organization"65 may personally contact members or
beneficiaries of such organizations66 if he is free to exercise "independ-
ent professional judgment on behalf of his client."6 7
Under the old rules, a lawyer was permitted to request referrals
only from a lawyer referral service operated, sponsored, or approved
by his local bar association.6" He could not "knowingly assist" a per-
son or organization that recommended legal services in promoting the
use of his services.69 He was, however, allowed to "cooperate in a dig-
nified manner" with specified group legal services organizations, in-
cluding legal aid offices, military assistance offices, bar associations and
any other constitutionally protected "nonprofit organization that rec-
ommends, furnishes, or pays for legal services to its members or benefi-
ciaries."7 The new rules allow a lawyer to be recommended by, as well
as to cooperate with, an almost identical list of organizations.71
The interaction of the rules concerning solicitation of clients and
recommendation of lawyers is unclear. The rule governing solicitation
states that such personal contact is "subject to" the rule concerning rec-
ommendation by legal services groups.72  Likewise, the recommenda-
tion rule sets forth the types of organizations that may recommend a
lawyer "under the provisions of' the solicitation rule.73 The rules do
not clearly indicate whether lawyers may only initiate personal contact
OKLA. STAT. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3, DR 2-104(A)(1) (1981) (amended 1983). The Model Rules, by
comparison, permit solicitation of persons with whom the lawyer has a "family or prior profes-
sional relationship," but not of close friends and other persons, at least if "a significant motive for
the lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's pecuniary gain." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 7.3 (1983).
64. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3, DR 2-103(A)(2) (West Supp. 1983).
65. Id The purpose of such organizations must include, but cannot be limited to, the rendi-
tion of legal services. Id
66. Id DR 2-103(A)(2)(a).
67. Id DR 2-103(A)(2)(b).
68. OKLA. STAT. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3, DR 2-103(C) (1981) (amended 1983).
69. Id DR 2-103(D).
70. Id; see In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 426 (1978) (the Supreme Court's decision in NAACP
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), established the principle that "'collective activity undertaken to
obtain meaningful access to the courts is a fundamental right within the protection of the First
Amendment.' ") (quoting United Transp. Union v. Michigan Bar, 401 U.S. 576, 585 (1971)).
71. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3, DR 2-103(B) (West Supp. 1983).
72. Id DR 2-103(A).
73. Id DR 2-103(B). This section makes reference to "DR 2-102(A)(2)," a non-existent rule.
This reference is apparently a typographical error. If so, the rule should probably refer to DR 2-
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under the auspices of organizations which meet the standards of both
rules.
Finally, the new rules specify three situations in which an attorney
may not make personal contact with a prospective client: (1) when the
lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the client could not exer-
cise reasonable judgment in choosing a lawyer;74 (2) when the client
has informed the lawyer he does not desire to be contacted;75 and
(3) when the communication involves coercion, duress or harrass-
ment.76 The old rules contained no comparable provisions.
D. DR 2-104: Communication of Fields of Practice
Prior to the adoption of the new rules, an Oklahoma lawyer could
not state that he limited his practice to or concentrated in a particular
field,77 that he was engaged in the "general practice of law,"78 or that
he did not practice in certain fields. 79 All these statements are allowed
by the new rules.80
As before,81 a lawyer is permitted to advertise the fact that he spe-
cializes in patent, trademark or admiralty law.82 Lawyers in other
fields, however, cannot indicate that they are specialists or experts un-
less they are certified as specialists by the Oklahoma Supreme Court.83
At present there is no such certification procedure in Oklahoma.84
74. Id DR 2-103(C)(1); see also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3 com-
ment (1983) ("A prospective client often feels overwhelmed by the situation giving rise to the need
for legal services, and may have an impaired capacity for reason, judgment and protective self-
interest.").
75. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, ch. I, app. 3, DR 2-103(C)(2) (West Supp. 1983).
76. Id DR 2-103(C)(3).
77. OKLA. STAT. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3, DR 2-101(B)(8)(a) (1981) (amended 1983). Such lan-
guage is also prohibited under the Model Rules, as the drafters believed it has "acquired a secon-
dary meaning implying formal recognition as a specialist." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 7.4 comment (1983).
78. OKLA. STAT. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3, DR 2-101(B)(8)(b) (amended 1983).
79. Id DR 2-101(B)(8)(c).
80. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3, DR 2-104(A) (West Supp. 1983).
81. OKLA. STAT. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3, DR 2-105(A)(1) (1981) (amended 1983).
82. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3, DR 2-104(A)(l)-(2) (West Supp. 1983) (allowing
lawyers to use the terms "Patent Attorney," "Proctor in Admiralty," or "substantially similar"
designations). Lawyers in these fields have historically been permitted to advertise their special-
ties. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.4 comment (1983).
83. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3, DR 2-104(A)(3) (west Supp. 1983).
84. In 1982, the Oklahoma Bar Association established a committee to study the advisability
of certification. Bond, Formal Legal Specialization in Oklahoma: Report of the OBA Committee on
Legal Specialization, 54 OKLA. B.J. 827, 827 (1983). This committee submitted a "Plan for Recog-
nition and Regulation of Specialization in the Law" to the Oklahoma Bar Association's Board of
Governors. Final Recommendations ofthe OBA Committee on Legal Specialization, 54 OKLA. B.J.
1391, 1391 (1983). On November 4, 1983, the Oklahoma Bar Association House of Delegates
[Vol. 19:292
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E. DR 2-105: Firm Names and Letterheads
The former rules prohibited a lawyer in private practice from us-
ing a trade name." The new rules permit the use of such names as long
as they are not false or misleading and do not suggest an affiliation with
a government agency or public or charitable legal services
organization.86
The former restrictions on signs, letterheads, and other profes-
sional designations87 have also been eliminated, leaving such material
subject only to the "false and misleading" standard applicable to all
lawyer communications. 8 Signs, letterheads, and other professional
designations are no longer required to be in "dignified form" as they
were under the old rules.89
As with the former rules,90 a law firm with offices in more than one
jurisdiction may use the same name in each jurisdiction,9 although
"identification of the lawyers in an office of the firm [must] indicate the
jurisdictional limitations on those not licensed to practice in the juris-
diction where the office is located."92 A firm name may not include the
name of a lawyer holding public office who is not regularly practicing
with the firm,93 nor may it falsely indicate that the firm's lawyers are
practicing in a partnership or other organizational form.94 Both provi-
sions were included in the former rules. 95 The new rules do not, how-
ever, contain previous restrictions forbidding a lawyer to indicate on
his letterhead, office sign, or professional card that he is engaged in
another profession or to indicate on his other professional publications
that he is a lawyer.
96
voted against the proposal by a 43-42 margin. Specialization of Legal Profession Fails at
Oklahoma Bar Association Meeting, 54 OKLA. B.J. 2888, 2888 (1983). In view of this narrow
defeat, it appears likely that the proposal will be reconsidered in the future.
85. OKLA. STAT. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3, DR 2-102(B) (1981) (amended 1983).
86. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3, DR 2-105(A) (West Supp. 1983).
87. OKLA. STAT. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3, DR 2-102(A) (1981) (amended 1983); see supra note 10
and accompanying text.
88. OKLA. STAT ANN. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3, DR 2-105(A) (West Supp. 1983).
89. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3, DR 2-102(A) (1981) (amended 1983).
90. See id DR 2-102(D).
91. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3, DR 2-105(B) (West Supp. 1983).
92. Id
93. Id DR 2-105(C).
94. Id DR 2-105(D).
95. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3, DR 2-102(B)-(C) (1981) (amended 1983).
96. See id DR 2-102(E).
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F. DR 2-106 Prohibition on Employment
The new rules prohibit a lawyer from accepting employment
"when he knows or it is obvious that the person who seeks his services
does so as a result of conduct prohibited" under the Disciplinary Rules
concerning advertising and solicitation.97 Similar provisions in the for-
mer rules applied only to communications involving recommenda-
tions98 and solicitations99 of professional employment. The Model
Rules contain no similar provision.
III. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE NEW RULES
The Supreme Court recognized in In re R.M.J 100 that the states
have power to regulate even nonmisleading lawyer advertising, as well
as advertising which is potentially misleading, inherently misleading,
or shown to be subject to abuse. 01 That power, however, is not abso-
lute. To constitutionally regulate nonmisleading advertising, a state
must assert "a substantial interest and the interference with speech
must be in proportion to the interest served."' 2 Such regulations are
subject to the closest judicial scrutiny and must be narrowly drawn.I"
Moreover, in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,' ° 4 the Supreme Court im-
plied that the state's interest in preventing potential adverse effects on
professionalism and quality legal services did not warrant regulation of
nonmisleading advertising.1
05
Potentially misleading advertising may be regulated by means of
restrictions "no broader than reasonably necessary to prevent the de-
97. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3, DR 2-106 (West Supp. 1983).
98. OKLA. STAT. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3, DR 2-103(E) (1981) (amended 1983).
99. Id DR 2-104(A).
100. 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
101. Id at 203.
102. Id Further, the state has the burden of showing that an advertisement is misleading, or
that a substantial state interest is being promoted by state-imposed restrictions. Thus, in R.M.J
the Court found Missouri's sanctions against an attorney who violated the state's advertising regu-
lations unconstitutional because Missouri failed to suggest or identify a substantial state interest to
justify its restrictions. Id at 205-07.
103. Id at 203.
104. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
105. Id at 368 ("[W]e find the postulated connection between advertising and the erosion of
true professionalism to be severely strained."). But see In re Utah State Bar, 647 P,2d 991 (Utah
1982) (Utah Supreme Court interpreted Bates as standing only for principle that the state's interest
in maintaining standards of dignity and professionalism did not justify a complete suppression of
lawyer advertising, but may still be considered a substantial state interest which will justify cur-
tailing certain types of advertising); Frank, Lawyer Advertising After the R.M.J. Case, 28 PRAc.
LAW. 53, 55 (1982) (suggesting that a carefully drawn "regulatory" scheme may still be constitu-
tional if supported by substantial state interests).
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ception."'' 0 6 In such cases the constitutionally preferable method of
preventing clients from being misled is the requirement of a disclaimer
or explanation of the information, rather than a total prohibition of the
advertising.t"7 Communications which are inherently misleading may,
however, be prohibited entirely.'08
Several of Oklahoma's former rules which were aimed at non-mis-
leading or only potentially misleading lawyer communications were of
questionable constitutionality. 109 The permissive approach of the new
rules appears to be more consistent with current constitutional stan-
dards. The Court in Bates acknowledged, "Advertising that is false,
deceptive, or misleading . . . is subject to restraint."11 Oklahoma's
new rules forbid only "false or misleading" communications."' The
subsection which defines such communications as those that contain "a
material misrepresentation of fact or law""12 or that are "materially
misleading" due to the omission of information 1 3 regulates, by its
terms, communications that are inherently misleading and thus within
the state's power to prohibit. The restriction on communications pre-
mised on achieving results through illegal or unethical means" 4 can
also be viewed as aimed at inherently misleading information.
Though comparative advertising may not be misleading per se,
comparisons which cannot be proven are also arguably inherently mis-
leading.t Inasmuch as Oklahoma's new rules prohibit only compari-
sons which cannot be factually substantiated," 6 this provision also
seems to be within the standards of R.M.J
The new Oklahoma rules also prohibit results oriented advertis-
106. R.MJ., 455 U.S. at 203.
107. Id; see also Durham v. Brock, 498 F. Supp. 213, 225 (M.D. Tenn. 1980) ("There are
many ways in which any deception in a facially truthful advertisement may be cured short of total
prohibition. Bates appears to approve of either supplementation or warnings or disclaimers as a
method of curing an advertisement which might otherwise have the potential to mislead.").
108. R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203.
109. See Hellman, supra note 8, at 552-63 (noting that the former rules' advertising content
regulations, media and size restrictions, and "professional and dignified" standard were of debata-
ble constitutionality in the wake of Bates); Recent Development, supra note I, at 145 (suggesting
that Oklahoma pattern its rules after those promulgated by the Kutak Commission).
110. 433 U.S. at 383, cited with approval in RM.J., 455 U.S. at 200.
I11. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3, DR 2-101(A) (West Supp. 1983).
112. Id DR 2-101(A)(I).
113. Id
114. Id DR 2-101(A)(3).
115. This would be particularly true of comparisons of the quality of lawyers' services. See
Bates, 433 U.S. at 383-84 ("[A]dvertising claims as to the quality of services. . . are not suscepti-
ble of measurement or verification; accordingly, such claims may be so likely to be misleading as
to warrant restriction.").
116. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3, DR 2-101(A)(4) (West Supp. 1983).
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ing.t17 Since "[s]uch information may create the unjustified expecta-
tion that similar results can be obtained for others without reference to
the specific factual and legal circumstances," ' ' it is at least potentially
misleading. Moreover, since Oklahoma's rule forbids only results ori-
ented advertising "likely" to create such unjustified expectations in po-
tential clients," 19 it is doubtful that the rule could be used expansively
against communications which are not purposely aimed at assuring a
particular outcome. If the rule's scope is limited in this manner, it
should be held constitutional.
20
The new rules' provisions concerning in-person solicitation 2 ' ap-
pear to present few problems of constitutionality. Although the
Supreme Court has held that in-person solicitation may be prohibited
entirely due to the likelihood of "fraud, undue influence, intimidation,
overreaching, and other forms of 'vexatious conduct,' ",122 the new
Oklahoma rules merely limit the number of situations in which in-per-
son solicitation is permissible. 23  Similarly, although the Supreme
Court has found prohibitions on the use of trade names in professional
practice constitutional, 21 Oklahoma permits attorneys to use trade
names as long as they do not mislead potential clients into believing the
law firm is governmental or charitable in nature. 25
Oklahoma's provision forbidding most lawyers from advertising
their fields of practice as areas of "specialization"'' 26 is intended to pro-
tect potential clients from being misled as to the lawyer's competence.
117. Id DR 2-101(A)(2).
118. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.1 comment; see also Virginia Phar-
macy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 773 n.25 ("[L]awyers ... do not
dispense standardized products; they render professional services of almost infinite variety and
nature, with the consequent enhanced possibility for confusion and deception if they were to un-
dertake certain kinds of advertising.").
119. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3, DR 2-101(A)(2) (West Supp. 1983).
120. See RM.J., 455 U.S. at 202 ("[T]he Court has made clear in Bates and subsequent cases
that regulation-and imposition of discipline-are permissible where the particular advertising is
inherently likely to deceive or where the record indicates that a particular form or method of
advertising has in fact been deceptive.") (emphasis added).
121. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3, DR 2-103 (West Supp. 1983).
122. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 462 (1978) (quoting Appellant's Brief at
25), cited with approval in .R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 202; see also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 7.3 comment (Final Draft 1982) (solicitation involves potential for "harassment,
overreaching, provocation of nuisance litigation and schemes for systematic fabrication of
claims").
123. See supra notes 60-67, 74-76 and accompanying text.
124. See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1979) (upholding Texas' prohibition on the
use of trade names by optometrists).
125. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3, DR 2-105(A) (West Supp. 1983).
126. Id DR 2-104(A).
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It is believed that indications of "specialization" imply expertise in an
area or official recognition of an attorney's abilities.' 27 Thus, such des-
ignations are potentially misleading. Oklahoma does not prohibit
mention of fields of practice, and even allows a lawyer to state that his
practice is "limited to" or that he "concentrates in" an area of the
law. 2 ' The restriction on indications of specialization can therefore be
viewed as the least restrictive means of preventing client confusion.
Some of Oklahoma's new rules stem directly from recent Supreme
Court decisions. For instance, the requirement that mailed advertise-
ments display the legend "This is an advertisement ' 2 9-in order to
alleviate the recipients' potential apprehensions about receiving mail
from lawyers' 3 -was suggested by the Court in R.MJ 13 The elimi-
nation of the requirement that advertisements be made in a "profes-
sional and dignified manner"' t32 may also have been influenced by the_R.MJ decision.' 33
IV. FULFILLMENT OF COMMERCIAL ADVERTISING OBJECTIVES
Lawyer advertising, like other forms of commercial advertising,
serves two purposes. First, it provides an opportunity for the lawyer to
increase his public exposure and his clientele. 134  Second, it provides
the consumer with information about available legal services.1 35 An
analysis of Oklahoma's new lawyer advertising rules should not be lim-
ited to whether they adequately comply with constitutional guidelines,
but also should examine whether the new rules facilitate the two objec-
tives of commercial advertising.
Under the new rules the lawyer is allowed a greater opportunity to
increase his public exposure, since he is now less restricted in what he
can say and how he can say it. A lawyer may now advertise on televi-
127. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.4 comment (1983).
128. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3, DR 2-104(A) (West Supp. 1983).
129. Id DR 2-102(E).
130. Interview with Frederick K. Slicker, Member, Oklahoma Special Committee on Legal
Advertising Rules, in Tulsa, Oklahoma (June 29, 1983).
131. 455 U.S. at 206 n.20 (Supreme Court suggests stamping "This is an advertisement" on the
envelopes of lawyers' general mailings if it is likely that the public would be alarmed by receiving
mail from law offices).
132. OKLA. STAT. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3, DR 2-101(B) (1981) (amended 1983).
133. See RM.J, 455 U.S. at 205 (although R.M.J.'s advertisement was in "bad taste," that
alone did not justify its prohibition).
134. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980).
135. Id; see also Bates, 433 U.S. at 377 (the Supreme Court found that it is the bar's "obliga-
tion to 'facilitate the process of intelligent selection of lawyers, and to assist in making legal serv-
ices fully available' ") (quoting MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-1 (1976)).
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sion, "one of the most powerful media for getting information to the
public, particularly persons of low and moderate incomes.""3 6 The ab-
olition of restrictions on advertising fee information13 7 and limitations
of fields of practice13 8 will allow lawyers to communicate to potential
clients more information about the services they offer. Lawyers may
now also focus on the information conveyed in their communications,
rather than speculative or subjective concerns such as the "dignity" and
"professionalism"'13 9 of their advertisements. Although such concerns
should not be abandoned entirely, excessive preoccupation with such
matters will unnecessarily stifle the free flow of information to
consumers. 140
Consumers of legal services will also be benefitted by the new
rules. A potential client will no longer have to guess whether the law-
yer he is calling will handle his type of case.' 4' The abandonment of
the regulatory approach 142 means the consumer will be able to make a
more informed decision when selecting a lawyer, rather than relying on
the limited information allowed under the previous rules. 143 The rules'
prohibition of false and misleading advertising' 44 will help assure that
lawyer advertising is accurate and tailored to the consumer's
understanding.
45
136. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.2 comment (1983).
137. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text. The lifting of this restriction also reflects
the trend toward lawyer specialization. A 1982 survey conducted by the Oklahoma Bar Associa-
tion indicated that 76% of Oklahoma's lawyers have a specialty and 56% favor the adoption of a
specialty certification program. Bethel, Report of/he 1982 Informational and Service Survey of the
Oklahoma Bar Association, 54 OKLA. BJ. 223, 246-50 (1983).
139. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
140. The importance of providing commercial information to the public was acknowledged in
Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765 ("It is a matter of public interest that [consumer decisions] be
intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free flow of commercial information is indispensa-
ble."). Further, the Court in Bates noted, "Although, of course, the bar retains the power to
correct omissions that have the effect of presenting an inaccurate picture, the preferred remedy is
more disclosure, rather than less." 433 U.S. at 375.
141. Shortly after adoption of the old rules, 76.6% of Oklahomans surveyed indicated, "Pres-
ently there is not enough information about lawyers to choose one intelligently." Kasulis & Hum-
phreys, Legal Services and the Oklahoma Public: A Survey, 50 OKLA. B.J. 2491, 2493 (1979).
142. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
143. See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770 (rejecting paternalistic attitude of the state phar-
macy board, stating that "people will perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough
informed, and that the best means to that end is to open the channels of communication rather
than to close them"), quotedin Bates, 433 U.S. at 365; MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 7.2 comment (1983) ("Limiting the information that may be advertised ... assumes that the
bar can accurately forecast the kind of information that the public would regard as relevant.").
144. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, ch. I, app. 3, DR 2-101(A) (West Supp. 1983).
145. Further protection for consumers may be found in the Oklahoma Consumer Protection
Act, OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, §§ 751-771 (1981). Other states have recently held that a lawyer may be
15
Welch: Oklahoma's New Rules on Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1983
L4WYER ADVERTISING
The new rules nonetheless present potential problems. Under the
former rules, a lawyer who advertised faced the difficult task of com-
plying with numerous restrictions on the content and format of his ad-
vertisements.146 The new rules simplify this task, but present an
equally challenging problem. The advertising lawyer must now inter-
pret provisions couched in vague and subjective language. 147 The pro-
visions of the new rules may also prove difficult to administer in a fair
and even-handed manner. If a lawyer errs in judgment by placing an
advertisement which is found to be misleading, he may be subject to
disbarment, suspension, public censure, or private reprimand. 148 Sus-
pension and disbarment, though perhaps appropriate punishments for
wilful refusal to read and comply with a code embodying the regula-
tory approach, appear to be excessive when levied on a lawyer who
misjudges the effect of an advertisement on potential clients. Further-
more, a lawyer may be disciplined under the Code although no client
or consumer has been damaged by his advertisement. 149 These factors
may encourage overcautious drafting of lawyer communications, which
in turn may impede the flow of adequate information to consumers,
thus thwarting one of the objectives of commercial advertising. 5 °
V. CONCLUSION
The Oklahoma Supreme Court in State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar As-
sociation v. Schaffer 5 1 recognized, "Advertising can play a meaningful
role in aiding consumers' recognition of a legal problem and in gaining
better insight into the economics of the law practice."' 52 Oklahoma's
new, more liberal, rules concerning lawyer advertising and solicitation
further this objective by increasing the flow of information to consum-
liable for his false and misleading advertisements under state consumer protection acts, as well as
under their ethical codes. See, e.g., Heslin v. Connecticut Law Clinic of Trantolo & Trantolo, 461
A.2d 938 (Conn. 1983); Reed v. Allison & Perrone, 376 So. 2d 1067 (La. Ct. App. 1979); DeBakey
v. Staggs, 605 S.W.2d 631 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980); see also Brady, From Client to Customer:' The
Hidden Impact ofBates v. Arizona, 48 OKLA. B.J. 2601, 2601-03 (1977) (noting "potential pitfalls"
of application of the Oklahoma Act to lawyers).
146. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
148. OKLA. STAT. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. I-A, Rules 1.5, 1.7 (1981). R.M.J., whose advertising was
violative of Missouri's "regulatory" code, was subjected to a disbarment proceeding and issued a
private reprimand by the Supreme Court of Missouri. In re R.M.J., 609 S.W.2d 411 (Mo. 1981),
rer'd, 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
149. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3, DR 2-101 to -106 (1983).
150. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563.
151. 648 P.2d 355 (Okla. 1982).
152. Id at 359.
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ers of legal services. If lawyers utilize the new rules to increase con-
sumer awareness of their legal rights and responsibilities, both
attorneys and their clients will benefit.
Jane . Welch
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